"By the fourteenth century, England possessed two distinct and somewhat rival court systems, known popularly as 'law' and 'equity' courts. Law courts were characterized by their development of the common law [(See common law.)], use of juries …, reliance on common-law pleading and the writ system, and a rigid formality in their approach to resolving legal conflicts. Equity courts adopted a more flexible approach to cases and provided for broad remedies.".[note] As we've indicated elsewhere,[note] law has a jurisdiction that is roughly equivalent to the jurisdiction of a jural compact, while equity is roughly equivalent to the jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical compact. If the equivalence between the jural jurisdiction and the common-law jurisdiction weren't rough, then we would claim that the jurisdiction of the common law was exclusively over delicts, meaning that it doesn't have jurisdiction over anything else. But this is not true. The common law sometimes had jurisdiction over subject matters that had little or nothing to do with delicts, as will be shown shortly. It's safe to say that criminal delicts and gross delicts are the same. This means that the common law had primary jurisdiction over gross delicts, just as the jural society has primary jurisdiction over gross delicts under the global covenant. But depending on the nature of the case, a subtle delict might be tried either under equity, or under law. —— The subject matters jurisdiction of equity courts was usually, but not always, contracts. But sometimes non-contractual civil actions were tried in equity. Likewise, sometimes contractual issues were tried at law.
In our analysis of the global Covenants, the distinction between the jurisdiction of the jural society and the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical society is extremely clear. The jural society has jurisdiction over delicts of all kinds, exclusively, while the ecclesiastical society has jurisdiction over contractual disputes, exclusively. Compared to these clear distinctions, the relative boundaries between law and equity are extremely messy. The problem with this messiness is that delicts demand a global in personam jurisdiction, while contracts do not. This messiness has existed for centuries. But it has gotten worse since the 1930s. That's because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted in 1938 presumed to blend law and equity, and thereby totally ignore the difference between global and local in personam jurisdictions that exists in Scripture. The reason this merger of law and equity is treacherous is because the total elimination of the distinction between global and local jurisdictions relegates consent to oblivion in the default application of all laws. To look at this treachery up close, we'll look at three concepts from law and equity: (1)unconscionable contracts, (2)injunctions, and (3)unjust enrichment.
