ARTICLE IV § 1:

Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

The Full Faith and Credit Clause establishes that the laws, records, etc., in one State will be honored in the other States. This is only a problem if one State has laws that inherently violate rights, or records that are inherently wrong, or laws that are inherently repugnant to the other State. For example, before the War Between the States, northern States were obligated to return runaway slaves to the "owners" in the South, based on this Full Faith and Credit Clause. These days the States have been largely homogenized into administrative provinces of the general government, and the kind of regional conflict that existed before 1860 is more difficult to find. Nevertheless, such conflict still exists.

This Full Faith and Credit Clause is more evidence that the framers were reaching for a confederate republic, without sufficient understanding of the principles necessary to its successful implementation. It's obvious that in a confederate republic, secular social compacts –– that are under an umbrella secular social compact –– need to supply "Full Faith and Credit" with regard to bloodshed, delicts, violation of rights, jural issues, etc. Murderers should not be allowed to escape prosecution simply by escaping to some State that doesn't have an extradition treaty. The same is true for someone accused of a private delict, a tort, a subtle delict, etc. Since the subject matter jurisdiction of a secular social compact is primarily over delicts, "Full Faith and Credit" between secular social compacts is relatively simple to understand. But what if the subject matter is not jural? —— To answer this question, we'll look at two scenarios: (i)applicability of "Full Faith and Credit" to contracts; (ii)applicability of "Full Faith and Credit" to "crimes" that violate laws against mala prohibita.

(i)Logically, a contract and specific terms thereof can be (a)both lawful and legal, (b)lawful but illegal, (c)legal but unlawful, or (d)neither lawful nor legal. —— (a)If a contract is both lawful and legal in the State of origin, then "Full Faith and Credit" is lawful and should also be legal in the target State. Who can argue rationally with that? (b)If a contract is lawful but illegal in the State of origin, then whatever it is in the State of origin that makes the contract illegal should be ignored in the target State. So "Full Faith and Credit" would not apply under such conditions. Who can argue rationally with that? (c)If a contract is legal but unlawful in the State of origin, then it should be both unlawful and illegal in the target State. So "Full Faith and Credit" would not apply under such conditions. Who can argue rationally with that? (d)If a contract is neither lawful nor legal in the State of origin, then it should be neither lawful nor legal in the target State. So "Full Faith and Credit" would apply under such conditions. Who can argue rationally with that? —— We'll take "same sex marriage" as an example of how this logic applies in the real world.

How does "Full Faith and Credit" apply between State Y, which doesn't recognize "same-sex marriages", and State X, which does recognize "same-sex marriages"? —— If States are clearly understood to be secular social compacts, then how can they rationalize issuing marriage licenses in the first place? This question has to be answered before any rational treatment of the "homosexual marriage" issue can be formulated. At this writing, one State, Massachusetts, has legalized "gay marriage". Many are justifiably afraid that judges in other States will apply the "Full Faith and Credit" clause, thereby in essence recognizing "gay marriages" established in Massachusetts, in other States. This fear is based on the assumption that the States are acting within their lawful jurisdictions when they issue marriage licenses and marriage certificates. There's no way to formulate a rational, Bible-based approach to this issue if we refuse to address the underlying issue of whether States are acting within their lawful jurisdictions –– as secular social compacts –– when they issue such licenses and certificates. Are they?

No! Here's why: A license is permission given by the State to do something that is otherwise illegal. Is marriage something that is inherently illegal? Absolutely not! Then how did States ever become the primary dispensers of marriage licenses? —— Prior to the War Between the States, Anglo-American common law held that marriage between races was illegal. It was called miscegenation, and each State had its special penalties for it. Out of sympathy for couples who desired to intermarry, State legislatures started allowing the issuance of licenses by State officials to allow for interracial marriages. In the decades after the War Between the States, such marriage licenses started becoming the norm among the urbane and sophisticated, and eventually became the norm for everyone who wanted to marry, except "gay" people. —— Was it right for these State legislatures to issue such licenses? —— Under the circumstances, probably so, but settling on this answer fails to get to the root of the problem. The root of the problem is, was, that interracial marriage was illegal in the first place. At its historical origins, the illegality of intermarriage was not primarily racial. It was primarily cultural. It was based on the split between "Christian" Anglo-Americans and heathens of any color. It was another instance of the "established" church imposing itself on the people who preferred to operate outside the State church's scope of powers. In other words, this whole problem with marriage licenses derives from the States being confused about whether they are secular social compacts or religious social compacts. —— Under the lawful jurisdiction of a secular social compact, should intermarriage be illegal? Absolutely not! Can it be illegal under a religious social compact? Sure! It depends entirely upon the nature of the religious social compact. But the fact is that the States have never been lawful religious social compact, and the only police powers they lawfully possess are secular police powers.

At their core, the States have absolutely no business issuing marriage licenses. So it appears that this whole issue evaporates if States insist on being lawful, i.e., if they insist on being secular social compacts. Is this true? Does this issue just evaporate? —— To answer this question, we should examine another document that is often issued through the State: the marriage certificate. A certificate merely certifies that something exists. These days, marriage license and marriage certificate are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably. So it's reasonable to wonder: If marriage licenses cease to exist, will marriage certificates also cease to exist? —— Maybe! It depends on how one looks at it.

Marriages have existed since before the State, or any government, was ever formed. If the State stops issuing marriage licenses, that doesn't necessarily mean that the State will stop certifying that marriages exist. People will continue getting married even if the State collapses. If the State collapses, they will have their marriages solemnized by people other than State officials: by priests, preachers, ministers, rabbis, mullahs, roadmen, chiefs, etc. These solemn religious officials might give the newly married couple a certificate that they can keep as evidence that they are married, in case anyone ever wants to question it. If the State hasn't utterly collapsed, then it might behoove the newly married couple to register their certificate at the County Recorder's (or Registrar's, etc.) office. This would give them extra security if anyone ever questioned their parental rights, or other rights and privileges that derive from their marriage contract. —— Since one of the lawful functions of a secular social compact is the registration of property, for the sake of facilitating the secular social compact's ability to enforce property rights, it's reasonable that secular social compacts would register contracts, since contracts always involve property or potential property. But registration of property under a secular social compact doesn't necessarily give jurisdiction to such secular social compact. If an official of a religious social compact marries two people, then such religious social compact's ecclesiastical compact would have original jurisdiction over disputes within the marriage contract. This is rational and true even if such contract was later registered within a secular social compact. This is rational and true also because secular social compacts have no business defining marriage. Marriage is inherently a type of contract, in the same way that bailment is a type of contract. But in both cases, the terms of the contract have priority over the rules used in interpreting the contract. Since marriage and religion have historically been intermingled, while bailment and religion have been much less so, it's now imperative for secular social compacts to forgo defining marriage, even while the secular definition of bailment stands. This means that a secular social compact cannot marry "gay" couples, because a secular social compact cannot lawfully marry anyone. But "gay" people certainly retain the right to enter and register secular contracts, like anyone else.

Conclusion: Secular marriages are unlawful, even though religious marriages are certainly lawful. If State X attempts to enforce marriage laws –– regardless of whether the marriage is homosexual or heterosexual –– then the attempt to enforce is unlawful, even though it may be legal. State Y should not be obligated under "Full Faith and Credit" to enforce State X's unlawful positive law.

(ii)Applicability of "Full Faith and Credit" to criminal laws against mala prohibita: A malum prohibitum is, "A wrong prohibited; a thing which is wrong because prohibited; an act which is not inherently immoral, but becomes so because its commission is expressly forbidden by positive law".[note] In other words, mala prohibita are acts that are wrong simply because so-and-so says they're wrong. They are not mala in se, wrong or evil in themselves. They are therefore not delicts. So a legal action against a malum prohibitum is never ex delicto. Since all lawful actions are either ex delicto or ex contractu, an action ex malum prohibitum must be ex contractu. If such action is not ex contractu, then the action is unlawful. Therefore, if an action ex malum prohibitum is not ex contractu, it is an action that is not lawful, even if it is legal. Given a "crime" that is criminal because it is malum prohibitum, the existence of a contractual nexus is crucial to the law being lawful. —— We'll take the "driver's license" as an example of how this logic applies in the real world.

In early 21st century America, all States make it criminal to drive without a driver's license. If someone drives without a driver's license, doing no harm to anyone, then this driving is certainly not a malum in se. It is not evil in itself, and therefore not a delict. If a police jails a man for driving without a license, even though the man broke no other laws and damaged no property, the police action is against a "crime" malum prohibitum. But where's the contractual nexus? Did the man enter into a contract in which he obligated himself to procure a driver's license before driving? —— In this country at this time, there is virtually never a contractual nexus with regard to the driver's license. This is true for a number of reasons: (a)Secular social compacts –– i.e., the city, county, State, and "federal" governments –– own the roads, and make the rules that pertain to them. But road creation, maintenance, and ownership are not lawful functions of secular social compacts. Creation and enforcement of laws that pertain to such roads is also not a lawful function of a secular social compact. (b)The driver's license is never contractual because it is never consensual. Duress, coercion, threats, and the long and dangerous arm of big government are always there to encourage people to procure permission, i.e., a license, from the State before driving. (c)And plenty of other reasons. —— There is no contractual nexus because this whole arrangement is inherently unlawful. The driver's license is imposed without consent. People who procure a driver's license acquiesce under duress. —— If someone is fined in State X for driving without a driver's license, and this person moves to State Y to avoid paying the fine, "Full Faith and Credit" should not apply because the law in State X is inherently unlawful.

Since most people are so accustomed to doing business under the current regime, most people find it difficult to conceive of how order could be kept on American roads, streets, and highways other than through criminalization of such mala prohibita. The solution to this problem is essentially simple: By ensuring that there is a contractual nexus. Since secular social compacts have no business owning and operating roads, they need to be owned and operated by religious social compacts. Since the primary function of such a religious social compact would probably be operation and maintenance of roads and highways, it would be a highly secularized religious social compact. Nevertheless, religious social compacts have lawful capacity to function in ways that secular social compacts do not have lawful capacity. Since it's lawful for a religious social compact to own roads, it's lawful for them to make an offer to anyone who wants to hear it: "We own a highway. If you want to drive on it, we're happy to enter this contract with you to allow you to do so. Here are the rules of the road, and the contract that you need to sign. When you give us the designated fees, and sign this contract, we'll give you permission to drive." Here, there is definitely a contractual nexus. It may be an adhesion contract, but the latter is preferable to suffering coercion. Here, driving without a license is not a malum prohibitum simply because some dictator says that doing so is prohibited. It is inherently a malum in se, because it is trespass on private property. It is a form of theft. —— If someone enters such a contract, and later violates the rules of the contract, and flees to another State to avoid paying the contractual penalties, and such contract has been registered and recognized in the original State, then it's reasonable for the target State to honor the "Full Faith and Credit" clause. That's because the penalty against the malum prohibitum is contractual and lawful. If someone never enters such a contract, and drives anyway, and is prosecuted for trespass, and flees to another State to avoid the penalty, the action is ex delicto, and the target State should honor the "Full Faith and Credit" clause.

Since most people are so accustomed to doing business under the current regime, most people may find it difficult to conceive of what advantage such privatization of the roads and highways could yield. Most may be able to see virtually no advantage to such privatization. —— Besides keeping our laws rationally consistent –– which facilitates freedom for everyone –– such privatization eliminates the propensity of the mega-State to violate search and seizure laws, to abuse privacy through picture-id abuse, and to violate the natural person in many other respects.

In summary, the "Full Faith and Credit" clause is crucial to the health and stability of any federal system. But without clear and reliable definitions of the various jurisdictions, the tendency for abuse is huge.

ARTICLE IV § 2 clause 1:

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

This clause is like a corollary of Article IV § 1. In other words, it stands to reason that if the States give Full Faith and Credit to one another, a citizen of State X would be treated as a citizen of the united States while such citizen visited State Y. In other words, the "Privileges and Immunities" that accrue to citizens of the united States apply also to the "Citizens of each State". This makes sense. From the point of view of the global covenant, this clause is not at odds with the global covenant. But the problems in implementing this clause are something else.

Citizen is not defined in the Constitution, except by saying in 14^th Amendment § 1 that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.".[note] Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, each State had its own custom definition of "citizen". Before the War Between the States, the supreme Court ruled in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) that a person of African descent could not be a citizen of the united States. After this War, the 14^th Amendment repudiated the decision in Dred Scott, and replaced it with the principle of jus soli.[note] Jus soli literally means "right of land or ground".[note] Under jus soli, citizenship results from the place of one's birth. In contrast, under jus sanguinis –– literally "right of blood" –– citizenship derives from one's birth parents. Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott was essentially claiming that citizenship in the united States follows the rule of jus sanguinis. When the 14^th Amendment stated that "All persons born … in the United States, … are citizens of the United States … ", the 14^th Amendment essentially repudiated jus sanguinis as the basis for citizenship, and replaced it with the feudal principle of jus soli. Neither of these concepts is consistent with the global covenant because the global covenant contends that all people are created in the image of God, have unalienable Rights, and therefore have the right to either consent to a citizenship status, or to dissent. But jus soli is more consistent with the idea that citizenship status should be offered by the secular social compacts of the united States to anyone living perennially within it's geographical jurisdiction.

The jus soli interpretation of 14^th Amendment § 1 was not immediately accepted by the supreme Court after the amendment's ratification. For example, the Court ruled in Elk v. Wilkins (1884) that Native Americans born within the territorial boundaries of the united States were not automatically citizens because they were not entirely "subject to the jurisdiction" of the general government. That's because they were members of tribes, and subject to the jurisdictions of their tribal governments. But Congress later countermanded this decision.[note] —— By the end of the 19^th century, the Court's decisions were more consistently in agreement with jus soli. For example, in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), the Court ruled that since Wong Kim Ark was born within the territory of the united States, Wong Kim Ark was automatically extended citizenship status. But his parent's were denied citizenship because laws of the general government made it impossible for them to be naturalized.[note]

These days, there is a huge amount of ambiguity revolving around the differences between citizens and perennial inhabitants. That's because there don't appear to be very many, if any, advantages that citizens have over perennial inhabitants that are not citizens. This is mostly because of supreme Court interpretations of the "Privileges and Immunities" clause.[note] Under current interpretations of 14^th Amendment § 1, "most of the Constitution's key rights and liberties do not extend to citizens only. No less than the entire Bill of Rights applies to 'the people' –– citizen and the noncitizen alike".[note] For example, in Graham v. Richardson (1971) the supreme Court maintained that a State could not "deny welfare benefits to noncitizens based simply on their alien status".[note] In light of the so-called "war on terror" instigated by the general government after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, this kind of thinking by the supreme Court is not only asinine, but perilous. This goes to the whole question of what the privileges and immunities of citizenship are. Again, starting almost from the earliest days of the existence of the united States under the Constitution, this has been ambiguous, and in many respects at odds with the global covenant.

In Corfield v. Coryell (1823) a New Jersey statute prohibited any non-resident from gathering oysters in State waters. Justice Bushrod Washington claimed the statute was valid because it did not violate "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens". He claimed this because he believed that privileges and immunities are things that "are, in their nature, fundamental". He believed that they are things "which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments". For example, "the right to institute and maintain court actions" is such a fundamental "privilege". But oyster gathering is not such a universal "privilege", according to Washington, and New Jersey had a sovereign right to keep citizens of other States from gathering oysters in New Jersey waters.[note] —— From the point of view of the global covenant, secular social compacts are limited to protecting such "fundamental" privileges and immunities as "the right to institute and maintain court actions". So Justice Washington was correct in this respect. But according to what has happened since the War Between the States, each State in the united States is as much a secular social compact as the general government is. So a State doesn't have any business putting restrictions on oyster gathering, because such oyster gathering is the exclusive domain of religious social compacts and private individuals. That's because of the restricted nature of the subject matter that pertains to a secular social compact's geographical jurisdiction.[note]

Like most of the other jurisprudential thinking of the framers' generation, the supreme Court has thrown out Justice Washington's "natural rights" concept of privileges and immunities. The slash and burn strategies of Lincoln's Radical Republicans, and all subsequent generations of jurists, have practiced throwing the framers' baby out with their national consolidation bath water. For example, in Toomer v. Witsell (1948) the supreme Court repudiated South Carolina's license fees for out-of-state shrimpers as discriminatory. In the process, Justice Brennan wrote that, "A state's unequal treatment of nonresidents [must] be reasoned and suitably tailored.". In other words, the State only needs to have a "substantial justification" in order to maintain discriminatory laws. In other words, the supreme Court has replaced law with pragmatism, i.e., with rule by fiat. Under the global covenant, neither the general government nor any State government has any business whatever issuing licenses for something like shrimping, because secular social compacts don't have that kind of subject matter jurisdiction over its geographical territory.[note]

ARTICLE IV § 2 clause 2:

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the crime.

This clause is another corollary of Article IV § 1. It guarantees extradition from State to State. It contains nothing inherently at odds with the global covenant.

ARTICLE IV § 2 clause 3:

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

The type of "Person held to Service or Labour" here, could be either of two types: slave or indentured servant. An indentured servant owes "Service or Labour" due to the fact that he or she has contractually and consensually obligated his or her self. This type of "Service or Labour" is perfectly legitimate according to the global covenant. So if the Constitution, and the general government by way of the Constitution, mandate that a runaway indentured servant be returned by authorities to the State of origin, and to "the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due", no conflict with the global covenant can be found. But if the "Person" is a slave, his or her existence as a slave is by nature and definition bloodshed, and no State can be obligated by the Constitution, or by anything else, to be an accomplice to bloodshed. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was an abomination. The Dred Scott decision enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act and declaring that African-Americans could not be citizens was not only an abomination, but also a clear sign to all of us that the supreme Court is perfectly capable of being an enabler, a stooge for legalized crime perpetrated by the general and State governments.

ARTICLE IV § 3 clause 1:

New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

Article IV § 3 cl 1 pertains to the formation and inclusion of new States. There is nothing obvious about this clause that deviates from the global covenant.

ARTICLE IV § 3 clause 2:

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

Article IV § 3 cl 2 pertains to "Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States". This is essentially the application of Congress's "Power … To exercise exclusive Legislation" found in Article I § 8 cl 17 to any new territories that the general government may acquire. As long as this clause is strictly construed, there appears to be nothing obvious about it that deviates from the global covenant. Like Article I § 8 cl 17, Congress's power by way of this clause is not only supreme, but exclusive. Since history has provided monumental evidence of abuse of such exclusivity, this clause, like Article I § 8 cl 17, demands special attention. Much of what is said at Article I § 8 cl 17 and the 5^th Amendment pertains to this clause.

ARTICLE IV § 4:

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

When this section says "The United States shall … protect each [State] … against domestic Violence", it's not talking about family feuds and marital strife. This phrase could easily be taken by people like Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase –– in Texas v. White –– to be applicable to secession. It could easily be taken as a rationale for concluding that invasion of the South was justified on the grounds that the orderly rejection of membership in the united States by southern States was an insurrection perpetrated by a faction, rather than lawful secession executed by the sovereign within each of the southern States. Again, this argument is specious because King George made precisely the same argument against the seceding colonies. The situations were practically identical.[note] Such arguments depend hugely upon how the sovereign is defined. According to the global covenant, every human being is sovereign over his or her self. Those of us who are committed to the Bible's local Covenants surrender our sovereignty to God, and thereby become bona fide parties to such local Covenants. Likewise, anyone who consents to being a citizen of one of the States exchanges certain features of such personal sovereignty for such citizenship. For example, in exchange for the benefits of citizenship, one might agree, implicitly, to abide by majority rule. In this case the sovereign of the State is the majority rule of the citizens. But the sovereign was the "People in Convention"[note] with regard to (1)secession of the colonies from Great Britain and (2)ratification of the Constitution. In other words, the citizens of each State used majority rule to elect representatives to a convention, and such conventions (1)voted to secede from Great Britain and (2)voted to ratify the Constitution. The same process was used by the southern States to secede. They were no more illegal in the War Between the States than they had been in the War for Independence. So the claim that illegal factions led the seceding slave States is the pot calling the kettle black. So the north's claim to protection "against domestic Violence" is specious at best. This is even more obvious in view of the "Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive" phrase. This phrase means that the request and consent of the leading officials of the State are a prerequisite to the imposition of troops of the general government.[note]

But this section also contains the Guarantee Clause in which the general government pledges to "guarantee to every State … a Republican Form of Government". Now the question obviously becomes this: What is a "Republican Form of Government"? If the prevailing definition of republic is that it's a government based on the consent of the governed, then that would certainly be a sound and rational reason to invade the southern States, because slavery is an obvious violation of such consent. But this has not been the prevailing definition of "Republican" at any time in American history. From the perspective of the global covenant, it should be.[note]

The first major construction of the Guarantee Clause was delivered by the supreme Court in response to the Dorr Rebellion. In the 1840s Rhode Island had a constitutional crisis in which Thomas Dorr and his supporters disputed the legality of the State's existing government. In Luther v. Borden (1849), the supreme Court claimed that it didn't have "the power to assess either the legitimacy or the republican character of a state government".[note] Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, the same man who wrote the Dred Scott decision, claimed that the power to make such decisions was strictly Congress's. He claimed that such issues were political questions that were outside the scope of the judicial branch. —— From the point of view of the global covenant, all governments revolve around consent, and all governments are necessarily composed of both jural and ecclesiastical features, and such features define the parameters of consent. So consent is crucial to any definition of "Republican … Government".[note] Because every human being is responsible for enforcement against bloodshed, every human being is responsible for determining whether any given government is based on consent or not. If this is true of every human being, it's true of Chief Justice Taney and the rest of the supreme Court. Therefore, Taney's formation of the political question doctrine is essentially based on an evasion of responsibility, not only as a judge, but also as a human being. "Taney's reluctance to assert judicial power in Luther affected the constitutional development of the Guarantee Clause for the next century."[note]

"The political-question doctrine remains today one of the most influential monitors of federal jurisdiction".[note] This is because it is still used by the Court to avoid disputes that it reckons to be too hot to handle. For example, in Baker v. Carr (1962), the plaintiffs argued that the judicial branch had an obligation to fix what they claimed were racially malapportioned electoral districts. They made this claim based on the Guarantee Clause. But the Court refused to overhaul Taney's political question doctrine, or to use the Guarantee Clause. Instead, it used the Equal Protection Clause to reapportion these legislative districts. Even though the Court didn't overrule Taney's political question doctrine, it did expand their view of the Court's authority by implicitly enforcing the Guarantee Clause.

ARTICLE V:

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

Article V indicates the method by which the Constitution can be amended. Given that the Constitution is "the supreme Law of the Land" (Article VI cl 2), it's critical for us to understand that if the Constitution is circumvented by any means other than through amendment, it can only be through a consensual, contractual means that perpetrates bloodshed against no one. The right to contract is unalienable, and is therefore a higher law than this "supreme Law of the Land". But if the Constitution is circumvented through deception, intimidation, fraud, nonfeasance, malfeasance, misfeasance, or non-deliberate misconstruction, then the circumvention is illegitimate, and demands to be corrected and/or discarded. Lacking proof to the contrary, we are convinced that this is the case with most of the activities of the Federal Reserve banking system, the Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security Administration, all entitlement programs sponsored by the general government, most regulation of the economy by the general government, all businesses and enterprises run by or through the general government, and monetary and legal tender laws that violate the clear meanings of Article I § 8 cl 5, Article I § 8 cl 6, and Article I § 10 cl 1 –– and most State counterparts to all of the above.[note]

ARTICLE VI clause 1:

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

The fact that the debts that existed under the Articles of Confederation were not repudiated when the Constitution was adopted is an extremely important indication that the framers were using the Articles of Confederation as a foundation. Therefore, every similarity in language between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution should be taken as a key to understanding the Constitution. This claim is confirmed by the fact that the Articles of Confederation are included in the Statutes-at-Large. —— We see nothing inherently wrong with this clause.[note]

ARTICLE VI clause 2:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

"Laws of the United States":

This is usually called the "Supremacy Clause", for obvious reasons. The most far-reaching interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I § 8 cl 18) and the Supremacy Clause was delivered by the supreme Court in 1819, in McCulloch v. Maryland. "The specific issues involved [in this case] were the Congress's power to incorporate the … Bank of the United States and the right of a state to tax an instrument of the federal government [(namely its central bank)]."[note] —— In 1791 there was heated debate in Congress over whether the Constitution allowed the general government to create a national bank. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton had proposed the chartering of this national banking corporation. James Madison and Thomas Jefferson were the most vocal opponents. They "opposed the measure as unauthorized by the Constitution".[note] Congress and President Washington were persuaded by Hamilton's "loose construction of the Constitution". They chartered the bank for twenty years, at which time it would dissolve unless rechartered. When the twenty years were up, followers of Jefferson dominated Congress, and they declined to restore the bank based on their strict construction of the Constitution. After the second Bank of the United States expired in 1811,[note] there were five years of inflation and relative monetary disarray. Part of this disarray was probably caused by the War of 1812. But if one had asked how much of this inflation was caused by fractional reserve bankers creating money out of thin air, the correct answer would probably be, "Almost all of it!".[note] But that question was apparently not asked at that time. The Jeffersonians who controlled Congress tired of the economic problems and changed their minds about the bank. They chartered the third Bank of the United States in 1816. The strict construction of the Constitution was so popular among the general populations of all the States that some of the State governments started taxing the local branches of the third Bank.[note] Maryland adopted such a tax in 1818. James McCulloch, the head of the Baltimore branch of the third Bank refused to pay the tax. The original jurisdiction of the case was in Baltimore County, but it was eventually appealed to the supreme Court. The Court proclaimed the Maryland tax law unconstitutional.[note]

Before we look at the supreme Court's opinion, we should ask how this decision stands up against the global covenant. —— Without consent that is totally devoid of duress, no person can lawfully be subjected to confiscatory taxation for the sake of anything other than enforcement against bloodshed. So running banks, post offices, and interstate highways is outside the legitimate scope and purview of a lawful secular social compact. This doesn't mean that we are bound to a strict construction of the Constitution. It means that we are bound to a strict construction of Scripture. If we were committed to a strict construction of the Constitution, we would allow slavery to exist, given that the "Civil War amendments" had not been adopted. Under a strict construction of the global covenant, we would not allow slavery. We also would not allow anyone to have property that they acquired through their own blood, sweat, and tears to be stolen, even by government. When a government that is lawfully restricted to the jurisdiction of a secular social compact enters into an otherwise free market with coercion on its sleeve, it becomes unlawful and exercises monopolistic powers. These monopolistic powers influence competitors in such a manner as to inflict regulatory takings on such competitors. In other words, the government drives competitors out of business because the government-sponsored corporation is backed by confiscatory taxation that private businesses don't possess. So from this point of view, the second Bank was wrong, and the third Bank was also wrong. —— But the people were having difficult economic problems before the establishment of the second Bank in 1791, and they were having difficult economic problems during the five years between the expiration of the second Bank and the chartering of the third Bank. Doesn't this clearly teach us that we needed this bank, even as we need such a central bank at the beginning of the 21^st century? —— No one can reasonably claim that an organized banking system isn't a good thing. Likewise, no one can reasonably claim that a good postal system and good roads and highways are not good things. Everybody benefits from these things. But for the sake of the law, we need to ask if these things can only come into existence through the warping of secular social compacts. Is that the only way they can come into existence?

During the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, the monarchy of England patented numerous enterprises that the queen may have conceived as being impossible without her intervention. But people eventually learned to hate the monopolies that she created, and found that the economic system worked far better without royal patents. The same pattern has existed in the general government of the united States, under the influence of people like Alexander Hamilton. The general government has essentially patented certain economic activities, like these banks, post offices, post roads, etc. The assumption behind such patents is that without the government's intervention, these things would not get done. Hitler thought the same thing about the Autobahn. In fact, if incentive to pursue such projects exists in the private sector, there is no reason such things cannot be done in the private sector. In the private sector, they can be done without bloodshed, i.e., without violating people's property rights. In the public sector, they cannot be done without bloodshed, because of the inevitable nexus between confiscatory taxation and regulatory (and other) takings, on one hand, and government spending, on the other.[note] —— If Alexander Hamilton had a vision for a banking system that was privately owned and operated and didn't sponge off the government, a banking system that had branches in every State, he could have pursued that vision, and organized financiers to build such a system. Instead, he had a vision of the Constitution being used to build a consolidated national government in which Congress had plenary powers, so that the general government would be a monolithic source of royal patents.

In order to create an opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland that was consistent with the Constitution, Chief Justice John Marshall first addressed the issue, "has Congress the power to incorporate a bank?" (p. 401). To answer this question, he recounted the manner in which the Constitution had been ratified. It had been ratified by "specially elected conventions".[note] So he concluded that, "the government proceeds directly from the people; is 'ordained and established' in the name of the people" (p. 403). If the consent of everyone who paid taxes, and everyone who had to live under the laws of the united States, was thoroughly considered and accounted for in the election of these special ratifying conventions, then Marshall's argument would be valid. But as we've seen elsewhere,[note] the consent of all human adults within the geographical jurisdiction of the united States was definitely NOT considered in this ratifying process. So in effect, Marshall's claim that the Constitution was ratified directly by the people –– by the people in convention assembled –– is fallacious. It was ratified by some of the people, to the exclusion of others. In other words, it was imposed on some people without their consent. The effect of this was that what was really being established through the Hamiltonian / Marshallian construction of the Constitution was a dictatorship of the proletariat. Their view of the Constitution as a national consolidation was another Tower of Babel, a construction that was built on bloodshed. John Marshall followed Alexander Hamilton in his "loose interpretation" of the Constitution. Like Hamilton, he admitted that the powers created by the Constitution were enumerated. And like Hamilton, he also used the things like the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I § 8 cl 18) to rationalize the national consolidation.

In contrast to Marshall, the Jeffersonians believed that the Constitution was a compact between the States. Each State had a single, special convention that ratified the Constitution. So Madison and Jefferson rationalized that the Constitution was a compact between States, rather than a national consolidation. They in effect claimed that each State was a religious social compact that lent a small portion of its sovereignty to the formation of the general government. Given that the States were already well on their way to being lawfully nothing more than secular social compacts, their position was weak. Given the fact that their position was used to excuse slavery, their position was not just weak, but sick. —— According to Marshall's view, if "the people" want to create a bank, they have the sovereign right to do so. He said, "the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action" (p. 405). He based this claim on the Supremacy Clause. He claimed that "although the power to charter a corporation is not a specifically enumerated power, there is nothing in the Constitution that excludes it.".[note] From such ideas, Marshall excused the existence of the bank. He then went on to claim that in light of the Supremacy Clause, neither Maryland nor any other State had the power to tax an entity created by the general government.

Embedded in this opinion is Marshall's conviction that "a loose and expansive interpretation" of the Constitution is indispensable.[note] Even though President Madison signed the bill creating the third Bank, both Madison and Jefferson opposed Marshall's decision because of its megalomaniacal construction of the Constitution. The "decision seemed to sanction a federal program of internal improvements. Such a program would have involved not only the building of roads, canals, and bridges, but also an assortment of educational, scientific, and literary institutions throughout the country. … In the twentieth century McCulloch v. Maryland quickly became the virtually undisputed constitutional cornerstone for the federal government's broad involvement in the economy, for the New Deal and the Welfare State, and for various other social, scientific, and educational programs.".[note] —— As long as the general government is restricted to its