The last phrase in the passage that we've been calling the Noachian Covenant is, "These three were the sons of Noah; and from these the whole earth was populated." (Genesis 9:19). According to Genesis 10, Noach's three sons and their wives turned into a multitude of nations. —— The most obvious thing that's implied by this transition from one nation to many nations is that all the human obligations of the global covenant apply as much to the many as they do to the one. In our examination of these three Biblical Covenants that contribute to the formation of this global covenant, we discovered, reasoning from Scripture, a number of principles that also apply as much to the many as to the one. For the sake of exploring the implications of this transition from one to many, we'll posit many of these principles as maxims, showing how these maxims apply to the many. These maxims are not positive laws. They are rather guidelines to help us to understand how to apply such laws. They are inductions, or conclusions, that derive from the chronological exegesis.
[1] All of the human obligations of the global covenant apply equally to every individual and every nation.
As proven in the investigation, the terms of this global covenant apply to every human being in the law-enforcement epoch. This being the case, all human beings are obligated, under the global covenant,
(1) to behave in a manner consistent with the fact that they are created in the image of God, with the capacity for eternal life (Genesis 1:26-27; 5:3; 9:6);
(2) to behave in a manner consistent with the fact that they are created from the "dust from the ground" (Genesis 2:7; 3:19);
(3) to "rule over" the earth wisely, as good stewards (Genesis 1:26,28; 9:2);
(4) to reproduce abundantly, and towards that end, to participate in marriages and ecclesiastical societies (Genesis 1:28; 9:1,7);
(5) to eat from a menu for omnivores, avoiding consumption of blood (Genesis 1:29; 9:3,4);
(6) to avoid bloodshed, that is, perpetration of any delict (Genesis 9:6);
(7) to execute justice against any human perpetrator of a delict (Genesis 4:10-15; 9:5-6); and
(8) to execute justice against any animal that perpetrates a delict (Genesis 9:5).
Out of all these terms that apply globally to every human being, only one entails a penalty to be executed by humans against other humans: the obligation to avoid perpetration of a delict. The obligation to execute justice against a human perpetrator of bloodshed, and the obligation to execute justice against an animal perpetrator of bloodshed, are not accompanied by penalties. This means that if people refuse to execute justice against a perpetrator of bloodshed, there may be a penalty from God against those who refuse, but there is none mandated expressly by God, against those who refuse. Even so, reason demands that the default penalty that humans should execute against people who refuse to support the pursuit of justice against bloodshed, is to force them to support that pursuit. Regardless of whether the people who refuse to support the pursuit of justice are individuals or societies, people who adhere to the global covenant are obligated to force such people to cooperate in such pursuit. That's because all human beings are obligated to execute justice against perpetrators of delicts.
[2] God's courts administer justice in all three fields of perception, but the administration of justice in human societies inevitably revolves around physical evidence.
As a result of the fall, human perception is flawed. All human perception is flawed to some degree. Humanity may have all three fields (Spiritual, psychic, and physical) in common, but the physical field is the only field that is common to the awareness of all sane, adult humans. God doesn't have these perceptual flaws, so His courts render justice with inerrancy, based upon evidence from all possible sources. But because our perception is so fallible, our courts are compelled to rely only upon evidence that is reliable, which always derives from the physical senses.
A delict is always a physical act, which is always accompanied by physical evidence.[note] So it's obvious that any adjudication of a delict will revolve around physical evidence. But in an ecclesiastical compact, because the obligations are contractual, the evidence can be as arbitrary and subjective as the parties agree to make it. But because contracts are usually serious, the parties usually agree implicitly to keep the evidence physical.
[3] There are two overriding kinds of positive law: positive law that derives from a jural compact (from the Genesis 9:6 bloodshed mandate, being ex delicto), and positive law that derives from an ecclesiastical compact (being ex contractu).
Positive law is merely law imposed by people upon other people. There are two kinds of positive law: the kind that derives from a jural compact and the kind that derives from an ecclesiastical compact. —— Before the deluge, jural societies did not exist. So all positive laws that existed before the deluge derived from contracts,[note] and therefore subtended an ecclesiastical compact. After the deluge, positive laws derive from both jural and ecclesiastical compacts.
A jural society is a society dedicated to executing justice against any delict. An ecclesiastical compact is the complex system of agreements that bind a society together, and an ecclesiastical society is the resulting society. Even though these two societies coexist under the same social compact, they are by definition mutually exclusive. This is because their jurisdictions are different. Their in personam, subject matter, and geographical jurisdictions are all different. An ecclesiastical compact is based on the consent of the parties. A jural compact is not based primarily on consent, but is based instead upon the willingness and ability of people to enforce the jural positive law and execute its penalties.[note]
Even traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence made a clear distinction between actions ex delicto (typically actions at law) and actions ex contractu (typically suits in equity). It was understood that these two fields of law have different personal and subject matter jurisdictions, and therefore maintaining and comprehending their distinctions was crucial to the administration of justice. Most people groups have very little cognizance of these distinctions. God has providentially blessed Americans with this knowledge. We are obligated to live by it. —— Because enforcement against a delict implements as positive law the global mandate against bloodshed, such positive laws generally trump positive laws that derive from contracts. This is because covenant-keeping people are obligated to keep contracts subservient and obedient to the covenant. This is because this global covenant is God-ordained, while contracts are merely human-ordained.
[4] The impetus behind all jural positive laws is the fact that all people are created in the image of God, and are therefore equal in rights, and equal before the law.
Positive law that violates the spirit or letter of the global mandate against delicts is inherently illegitimate. The core characteristic of all positive law that's consistent with this global mandate is that it observes that all people are created in the image of God, and are therefore equal in rights before such positive law. Positive law that derives from contracts is geared to protect conventional privileges and disabilities that derive from such contracts. Even so, because jural positive law trumps ecclesiastical positive law, contractual positive law must avoid violating the fact that all people are created in the image of God, and are therefore equal in rights.[note]
[5] The impetus behind all ecclesiastical positive law is consent of the parties.
God created human beings as social creatures. Each of us therefore joins societies for myriad reasons: for the sake of refining one's relationship with God; for the sake of having other people cover one's perceptual frailties; for the sake of helping one-another procure life's other necessities; for the sake of loving one-another, communicating with one another, and comforting one-another; for the sake of sexual intercourse; for the sake of child-rearing; for the sake of helping one-another procure food; and for many other reasons. These myriad human desires, needs, pursuits (agreements, gifts, contracts) are the root impetus behind the formation of ecclesiastical societies and ecclesiastical compacts. These myriad human social pursuits have nothing to do with delicts of any kind. The underlying impetus for all these pursuits is common to every society. They are built by God into the human constitution. Even so, the manner in which these legitimate, organic desires are pursued can vary wildly, based upon a huge variety of views of reality. Since ecclesiastical compacts are by definition aggregations of agreements and contracts, and since such agreements and contracts by definition require consent of the parties, the ecclesiastical society itself requires the consent of the parties. While these basic human drives are impetus for their fulfillment, consent is the impetus for their fulfillment through an ecclesiastical society.
[6] Regarding in personam jurisdiction:
è Of jural compact: Every jural compact has personal jurisdiction over every human being within physical reach of the jural society.
This is true without regard to which social compact a suspect may be party.[note]
è Of ecclesiastical compact: Every ecclesiastical compact has personal jurisdiction only over parties to the ecclesiastical compact.
This is by definition of ecclesiastical compact.[note]
[7] Regarding subject matter jurisdiction:
è Of jural compact: Every jural compact has subject matter jurisdiction over bloodshed, that is, over gross and subtle delicts.
Since jural compacts derive, by definition, from the Genesis 9:6 mandate, and since that mandate pertains to bloodshed, and since we have discerned that bloodshed is equivalent to a delict, jural compacts clearly have subject matter jurisdiction exclusively over delicts. Since the penalty for a gross delict is justifiably retribution, and since retribution is the penalty specified in Genesis 9:6, we are certain that the jural compact has subject matter jurisdiction over gross delicts. But since the penalty for a subtle delict is justifiably restitution or injunction, rather than retribution, we cannot claim with absolute Biblical certainty that jural compacts have subject matter jurisdiction over subtle delicts. But we are certain that the Genesis 9:6 mandate is metaphorical, and that it therefore points to a more abstract, complex, and precise set of concepts than mere shed blood, and retribution against it. Reason demands the inclusion of the subtle delict as a form of bloodshed, because exclusion of it violates the impetus behind the mandate.
è Of ecclesiastical compact: Every ecclesiastical compact has subject matter jurisdiction only over contracts that subtend the ecclesiastical compact.
Every contract, in order to be enforceable, must specify, either explicitly or implicitly, how the terms of the contract are to be enforced. In the united States, it's generally assumed –– and therefore implicit –– that courts that have subject matter jurisdiction over suits in equity, and geographical jurisdiction over a given contract, will have such subject matter jurisdiction over that contract. If we think of all the equity courts in the united States as being bound together into an ecclesiastical compact,[note] then it's obvious how such an ecclesiastical compact has subject matter jurisdiction only over contracts that subtend that compact. But in a primitive society, whether a given contract falls within the scope and purview of a given ecclesiastical compact depends on the nature of that contract. Generally, people who want to have their contract disputes resolved will submit their dispute to a third party who is usually a leader or elder in the society where the contract originated. So even in a primitive society, this maxim still holds.
[8] Regarding geographical jurisdiction:
è Of jural compact: Every jural compact has geographical jurisdiction over whatever physical territory it is physically able to reach.
Because the impetus of the jural compact extends to every human being, it extends to every human being regardless of where such human being may be located. It extends to wherever the jural society is willing and able to enforce its authority.
è Of ecclesiastical compact: Every ecclesiastical compact has geographical jurisdiction only over physical territory that is specified explicitly or implicitly in the ecclesiastical compact.
Because an ecclesiastical compact is by definition an umbrella contract or agreement that aggregates contracts and agreements in a society, the compact can only have geographical jurisdiction over physical territory that is included in one or more of these contracts or agreements, and it is limited by each contract.
[9] Regarding reason for existence:
è Of jural society: Every jural society exists strictly to enforce against bloodshed, that is, against any gross or subtle delict.
This is by definition. The definition comes from a reasoned view of the first eleven chapters of Genesis.
è Of ecclesiastical society: Every ecclesiastical society exists strictly to gratify the myriad needs and desires that are inherent in the human constitution, through consent of the parties.
This includes every human being's innate need to be in covenant with God and other people, as well as every other need, desire, demand, etc., that can be gratified, supported, or encouraged by other people. This is by definition of ecclesiastical society.
[10] The ecclesiastical society has no innate commitment to observing that all people are made in the image of God, and have unalienable rights:
Even though ecclesiastical positive law must avoid violating people's rights –– in order to be Biblically legitimate –– such avoidance is not inherently built into every ecclesiastical society. ecclesiastical societies derive their power and existence from the consent of their parties. If the parties do not consent to avoiding violation of rights, either explicitly or implicitly, then the ecclesiastical society continues to exist until an act of God, or of a jural society, forces observance of such rights, or forces the ecclesiastical society's extinction.
[11] The ecclesiastical society's "consent of the governed" can easily decay into fiat rule by tyrants:
In an ecclesiastical society whose positive law is not observant of the fact that all people are created in the image of God and therefore have unalienable Rights, the ecclesiastical society easily devolves into a "dictatorship of the proletariat",[note] a glorified form of mob rule, an oppressive majority, an oppressive minority, or fiat rule by tyrants. This is because wherever the image of God is not respected, consent is likewise not respected.[note]
[12] A positive law that cannot be enforced is not a real positive law.
Since positive law is law imposed by humans upon humans, and since the mandate against perpetration of a delict is the global covenant's only global obligation that has a penalty to be executed by humans; this obligation to avoid perpetration of a delict is the only obligation that comes close to being positive law. This is because, for any obligation to be real positive law, such positive law must be enforceable. There are two obvious prerequisites to any obligation being humanly enforceable: (1)There must be a penalty to be executed by humans. (2)There must be someone willing and able to enforce it.
Not one of these eight obligations of the global covenant meets both of these two prerequisites. Seven have neither human penalties nor obvious enforcers. The mandate against perpetration of a delict has the penalty, but no obvious enforcers. Therefore, none of them has the jurisprudential status of positive law; although each has the potential for it. Each may be real eternal law, natural law, or divine law,[note] but if they don't enforce societal norms, then they are not positive law. So out of these eight human obligations in the global covenant, only the avoidance of the perpetration of a delict is even remotely like positive law. All terms of the global Covenants are globally applicable, but all are not globally enforceable.
Ü corollary: A real positive law demands a penalty.
To see how penalties are essential prerequisites to the existence of real positive law, consider this scenario involving a driver and a traffic cop: Police are law enforcement officers, meaning that they put laws into effect. But what would happen if police tried to enforce laws that had no penalties? For example, if the speed limit was thirty miles-per-hour, but you chose to drive fifty through that speed zone, a policeman might try to pull you over to give you a ticket. If there were no penalty for exceeding the speed limit, then you could wad up his citation and throw it in the trash with impunity. If there were no penalty for refusing to heed a traffic cop's instructions, then when he tried to pull you over, you could thumb your nose at him as you kept on speeding, all with impunity. A law without a penalty is a law that cannot be effectively enforced. A law that cannot be enforced is in fact no law at all.
To see how this fact pertains to jural positive law, consider the following scenario: Mr. X murders Fred. Mr. X is not a party to our social compact. Even so, our jural society will pursue Mr. X to execute retribution against him. This is because the bloodshed mandate, like all the terms of the global Covenants, applies to all people; but unlike the global covenant's other human obligations, the mandate to avoid perpetration of a gross delict has a penalty, namely, retribution against the perpetrator. So if Mr. X is within reach of our jural society, it will execute retribution against him. But if the global covenant did not provide this global penalty, then there would be no distinction between the jural compact and the ecclesiastical compact. Mr. X would be as free as Kayin to repeat his offense, unless the ecclesiastical society arbitrarily decided to stop him. Without a penalty, a jural positive law cannot exist.
To see how the fact that lack of penalty entails lack of enforceability entails lack of positive law, to see how this fact applies to ecclesiastical positive law, consider the following scenario: Mr. X drinks animal blood. Mr. X is party to our social compact. Our ecclesiastical compact forbids the drinking of animal blood. But no penalty is specified. Since no penalty is specified, we have no leverage with which to compel Mr. X to abide by our standards. So we either give up our standards, or put a penalty in place. But since an ecclesiastical society operates by consent, if Mr. X refuses to consent to the adoption of a penalty, the ecclesiastical society still has no leverage with which to compel compliance. Unless a mechanism like majority rule is a prerequisite to participation in the ecclesiastical society, from the beginning, no mechanism exists by which to compel Mr. X into compliance, unless we resort to perpetrating a delict against him.[note]
Ü corollary: A real positive law demands that there be people willing and able to enforce it.
Even if a law has a penalty, if there's no one willing and able to enforce it and execute the penalty, it has no real existence. Consider this scenario: If you like to speed through a 30 m.p.h. speed zone at 50, and you know there's a penalty for speeding, but the policeman assigned to patrol this speed zone is a one-legged, blind midget with a skateboard, then the enforcement officer doesn't have the capacity to enforce. As long as there's no one there to enforce the speed limit, who also is willing and able to enforce it, you won't get a ticket. —— So if there's no one willing and able to enforce an obligation, practically, the obligation doesn't exist as positive law, regardless of whether the obligation is jural or ecclesiastical.
ðsub-corollary: Real ecclesiastical positive law is based on the consent of the parties to an agreement or contract. It applies only to those parties. As a prerequisite to being positive law, it demands that there be someone willing, able, and designated by contract to enforce it.
Mr. X drinks blood. Mr. X is not a member of our ecclesiastical society. Since his drinking blood does not result in a dead, damaged, or injured party, his blood drinking is outside the jurisdiction of our jural society. Since he is not a member of our ecclesiastical society, he is not subject to its standards (unless he does these things in a geographical location governed by the ecclesiastical society, in which case they can expel him). The ecclesiastical terms of the global covenant[note] may apply to all people. But they are not enforceable against all people, because no positive law penalty is specified in Scripture for it. There is therefore no one able to enforce it against people who do not consent to abide by it.
ðsub-corollary: Real jural positive law demands that there be someone willing and able to enforce it. It is not based on consent of the parties. It applies to anyone who violates it.
Because the mandate against any delict is accompanied by a penalty, it may appear that the many jural compacts inherently mandated to exist in each new nation created by the disintegration of the Babel project, would have teeth, compared to the obligations that incur no penalty.[note] But this is not necessarily true. The jural obligations could be as toothless and un-enforceable as all the other obligations of the global covenant. This is because the existence of a penalty is not enough to make a law enforceable. There is one other essential ingredient. In order for a law to be enforceable, there must also be people who are willing and able to enforce it. —— Likewise, if there's no one willing and able to enforce the mandate against a delict, it won't be enforced.
Mr. X murders Fred. Mr. X is not a member of our ecclesiastical society. Even so, our jural society will pursue Mr. X to execute retribution against him. This is because the bloodshed mandate, like all the terms of the global Covenants, applies to all people.[note] So if Mr. X is within reach of our jural society, it will execute retribution against him.
If a society decides collectively, by the consent of all having capacity, to abide by the global covenant's jural obligations, then the enforcement against perpetrators of a delict is not so problematical. For most intents and purposes, both the penalty requirement and the people-willing-and-able requirement are met. But if all do not consent, no one is delivered from the obligation. All are still obligated to abide by the jural obligations.
According to the bloodshed mandate, all people are obligated to execute retribution against perpetrators of a gross delict. But what if people refuse to do that, and refuse to help in the execution of justice against delicts in any way? —— According to the global covenant, there is no penalty against people who exercise such a refusal. But because refusal to recognize the obligation to execute justice against delicts is essentially an insistence on returning to the anarchy era, and because such an insistence is hostile to God's clear intentions in implementing the bloodshed mandate, we believe such a penalty is rationally required. The fact that taxation is generally obligatory is proof that our Anglo-American jurisprudence concurs, albeit with some confusion.
This is the difference between instantiated law and un-instantiated law. If it's not enforced, then it's not instantiated.
[13] Lawful taking exists to enforce positive laws.
Not all people are qualified to enforce positive laws. Therefore, for those who are not qualified –– who are incapacitated or constrained in some way –– other mechanisms for participation in the enforcement of positive laws exist.
Ü corollary: Lawful jural taking exists to enforce jural positive laws.
All people may not be qualified to enforce positive laws, but all people are obligated by the bloodshed mandate to enforce jural positive laws. Some societies might contractually devise a mechanism via which parties not qualified or capable could contribute by giving things of value to people who are qualified and capable. Since the bloodshed mandate is mandatory for all people, it stands to reason that all parties to a social compact would be required by such social compact to contribute valuables to the jural society for the enforcement of jural positive laws. Likewise, it's reasonable that the social compact would contain penalties against parties who refused to contribute. This way, all parties to the social compact are able to fulfill their obligation. We call such mandatory contributions to the jural society, jural takings. Jural takings include jural taxation and giving testimony as a witness to a delict (which can either be voluntary, or forced cooperation via subpoena).
Ü corollary: Ecclesiastical takings exist to enforce ecclesiastical positive laws.
Since ecclesiastical positive law only pertains to parties to the ecclesiastical compact, the positive laws that derive therefrom are contractual, and exist by consent alone. It therefore does NOT make sense that all parties to the social compact should be obligated to pay for the enforcement of positive laws that might not apply to them. Instead, it makes sense that all parties to all contracts would devise their own private enforcement mechanism, including equity courts paid for by litigants, if deemed by the parties to be appropriate. Such ecclesiastical takings are thereby nothing more than fees paid by litigants for court costs. By confining ecclesiastical takings to those who use ecclesiastical courts, the society avoids violation of the consensual nature of the ecclesiastical compact.
Taking (especially taxation) is historically the point of most common abuse. It is the point at which the failure to distinguish jural and ecclesiastical jurisdictions most often manifests. For example, it's common in the united States for people whose primary responsibility is the enforcement of jural positive law to spend tax payer money on non-jural boondoggles. This is just one of thousands of ways in which this distinction between these two kinds of compacts is overlooked. It is one of scores of ways that people use the social compact to perpetrate delicts with impunity. When this abuse of power exists, people need to recall the vigilante impetus behind the jural mandate. Under such circumstances, the corrective positive laws are those that individual people are willing and able to enforce, perhaps to the vexation of tax collectors.
